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EMPLOYMENT CASES: A
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GREGORY S. FISHER*
This Article examines the role of after-acquired evidence in employment cases, and in which instances such evidence, found after
an employer has already disciplined the employee, may bar suit or
preclude some form of relief. The Article begins by defining and
explaining the governing principles of after-acquired evidence,
and continues by contextualizing and applying these principles in
both employment discrimination and wrongful termination cases.
This Article progresses by finding fault with the present treatment
of after-acquired evidence, and continues by presenting its own
comprehensive approach for how such evidence should be treated
in employment law cases in Alaska. The author concludes by suggesting that the Alaska judicial system should attempt to develop a
uniform method to deal appropriately with after-acquired evidence in employment cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What effect should after-acquired evidence have in employment litigation? No clear rules have emerged in Alaska. In cases
alleging employment discrimination claims under federal law, it is
now well established that after-acquired evidence limits damages
1
but does not bar suit. However, in cases not implicating unlawful
discriminatory motive, state courts have not articulated consistent
principles. The developing weight of authority holds that afteracquired evidence bars suit in ordinary wrongful termination
2
3
cases, but contrary authority does exist. In addition, corollary
questions remain unanswered. For example, courts do not agree
on the applicable burden of proof. Some courts hold that employers may establish the existence of after-acquired evidence by a pre4
ponderance of the evidence. Other courts require proof by clear
5
6
and convincing evidence. Still other courts are silent on the issue.
Courts also differ on whether an employer’s decision to impose
discipline based on after-acquired evidence should be governed by
an objective “reasonable employer” standard or whether employ-

1. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361-62
(1995).
2. See, e.g., O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 795
(Ariz. 1998) [hereinafter “O’Day II”]; Lewis v. Fisher Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d 440,
444-45 (S.C. 1998); Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, Inc.,
933 P.2d 743, 745-46 (Kan. 1997) [hereinafter “Gassman II”]; Crawford Rehabilitation Serv., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 547-48 (Colo. 1997).
3. See, e.g., Mosley v. Truckstops Corp. of Am., 891 P.2d 577, 582-84 (Okla.
1993) (holding after-acquired evidence inadmissible in case alleging retaliatory
discharge for filing workers’ compensation claim); Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n, 720 P.2d 257, 264 (Mont. 1986); see also Southern Med. Health
Sys., Inc. v. Vaughn, 669 So. 2d 98, 100 (Ala. 1995) (by implication); Stephen J.
Humes, Annotation, After-Acquired Evidence of Employee’s Misconduct as Barring or Limiting Recovery in Action for Wrongful Discharge, 34 A.L.R. 5th 699,
719-21 (1995).
4. See O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 761 (9th
Cir. 1996) [hereinafter “O’Day I”] (holding after-acquired evidence must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that employee’s misconduct would have led to
termination); accord Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir.
1992); Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 616 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984);
Preston v. Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Co., 647 A.2d 364, 368-69 (Conn. 1994).
5. See Lewis, 495 S.E.2d at 445 (holding that after-acquired evidence must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that employee’s wrongdoing was so severe
as to justify termination had the employer known of the conduct at the time).
6. See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361-62.
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ers may rely upon their subjective discretion to interpret and apply
their own work rules in imposing discipline.7
The Alaska Supreme Court has not addressed these issues.
8
However, in Brogdon v. City of Klawock, the court offered dicta
suggesting that it may adopt a restrictive approach to the use of af9
ter-acquired evidence. This stance would make it difficult for employers to invoke such evidence as a defense in employment litiga10
tion. The court expressed concerns that employers might use
after-acquired evidence to justify pretextual disciplinary decisions
and stated its view that “[a]fter-the-fact justifications should be
11
viewed with skepticism.” The court suggested, without holding,
that it might be appropriate to require employers to establish the
existence of after-acquired evidence by a heightened burden of
proof, which would in effect be a clear and convincing standard,
and it might restrict the use of after-acquired evidence only to instances where all reasonable employers would have imposed disci12
pline in the first instance. Three years have now elapsed since
Brogdon, but the Alaska Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to revisit this issue during this time.
This Article examines after-acquired evidence in the context
13
of Alaska law. Part I and Part II briefly review the history of after-acquired evidence and outline its relevant principles in light of
applicable case law and general policy concerns. Part III discusses
problems with current analyses. This Article contends that courts
have done little to define after-acquired evidence adequately and
develop principles to apply it properly. As a result, courts often in7. See, e.g., Crawford Rehabilitation Serv., Inc., 938 P.2d at 549 (holding after-acquired evidence is governed by a reasonable, objective employer standard).
But see O’Day I, 79 F.3d at 761-62 (applying by implication a subjective standard
by holding that employer’s reliance on after-acquired evidence was established by
unrebutted affidavit submitted by employer attesting it would have terminated
O’Day had it discovered his misconduct); accord Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, Inc., 921 P.2d 224, 233-34 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996)
[hereinafter “Gassman I”] (establishing reliance on after-acquired evidence upon
employer’s proffer that it would have terminated Gassman had it known about
her misconduct, thereby impliedly adopting a subjective standard), aff’d and remanded, Gassman II, 933 P.2d 743.
8. 930 P.2d 989 (Alaska 1997).
9. See id. at 992.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Although the focus is on Alaska law, the general principles may be applied
in other jurisdictions subject to modifications necessary to reflect laws unique to
each forum.
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appropriately apply after-acquired evidence in employment cases.
In the specific context of Alaska law, for example, this Article argues that the Brogdon court’s dicta conflicts with existing legal
principles, represents questionable policy, and needlessly fosters
confusion in an already complicated area of law. Part IV of this
Article offers a proposed model for analyzing and applying afteracquired evidence in Alaska.
This Article recommends that the Alaska Supreme Court decline to embrace the sweeping principles suggested by Brogdon
when the court is next presented with the issue of after-acquired
evidence. Instead, the court should analyze after-acquired evidence using existing contract and equity principles. In cases alleging ordinary wrongful termination claims under state law, this Article suggests that Alaska adopt the majority rule that after-acquired
evidence bars suit. Where employees allege employment discrimination claims under state law, this Article concludes that a test patterned after the approach taken in federal discrimination cases
should be used with a slight modification. In such cases, afteracquired evidence should limit available damages to a period between the date of wrongful discipline and the date when the employee committed the misconduct. In all cases, an employer should
be required to establish by a preponderance of evidence that it reasonably believed the alleged misconduct was committed and that it
would have imposed discipline had it discovered the misconduct at
14
an earlier time. By applying existing principles, Alaska courts will
be able to develop a consistent and coherent body of law that protects the rights and interests of all concerned.
II. AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
A. Definition and Governing Principles
After-acquired evidence is evidence independent of employee
misconduct that the employer discovers after it has already disci15
plined the employee on different grounds. For example, if an em14. An employer’s decision adversely affecting terms and conditions of employment may encompass a wide range of actions including termination, demotion, salary reduction, job re-classification, transfer, and other actions. For simplicity’s sake, this article refers to all such adverse decisions as “discipline” unless
the specific context requires otherwise.
15. See, e.g., Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d
329, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Gassman I, 921 P.2d 226 (“The after-acquired evidence doctrine in its purest form allows an employer to be relieved of liability in a
wrongful discharge lawsuit where it discovered, normally during litigation, that the
employee was guilty of pre-discharge misconduct sufficient for termination that
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ployer has sanctioned a worker for stealing company property and
then subsequently discovered that the employee had lied on her
employment application, evidence of the falsified employment application would constitute after-acquired evidence and would be
independent grounds justifying discipline.
The after-acquired evidence doctrine finds its source in the
16
common law of contract and equity. Under general contract principles, breach of a contract is not actionable if a legal basis existed
for excusing performance, even if the breaching party was unaware
17
of that legal excuse. In equity, the doctrine of unclean hands may
bar a party from relief if that party has engaged in fraudulent, de18
ceitful, or unfair conduct. Implicit in the application of afteracquired evidence is the premise that an employee who has committed wrongdoing that would have led to her discipline if the employer discovered the misconduct cannot complain if the employer
19
imposes discipline for some other reason.
After-acquired evidence generally falls into two broad catego20
ries. First, after-acquired evidence often arises when an employer
discovers that an employee has made fraudulent misrepresenta21
tions in a job application or résumé submitted to the employer.
Second, after-acquired evidence sometimes involves pre-discipline
misconduct that the employer did not discover until after the em22
ployee filed suit. An additional category, post-discipline misconduct, logically fits within the concept of after-acquired evidence but
23
has not found favor with the few courts that have addressed it. It
is possible to further classify after-acquired evidence by reference
to whether the alleged misconduct is related to a violation of ordi-

the employer was unaware of and was not relying upon for discharge.”) (citing
Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988));
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995).
16. See O’Day II, 959 P.2d at 795-96 (emphasizing contractual nature of afteracquired evidence); Gassman I, 921 P.2d at 230 (noting that three theories support
application of after-acquired evidence: legal excuse, unclean hands, and fraud).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 237 cmt. c, illus. 8; 225
cmt. e; 385 cmt. a (1979).
18. See Gassman I, 921 P.2d at 230-31.
19. See id. at 226.
20. See Camp, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335.
21. See Crawford Rehabilitation Services, Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 549
(Colo. 1997).
22. See Lewis v. Fisher Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d 440, 441-42 (S.C. 1998).
23. See, e.g., Carr v. Woodbury County Juvenile Detention Ctr., 905 F. Supp.
619, 627-29 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
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nary work rules or pre-litigation activity.24 A number of afteracquired evidence cases involve pre-litigation efforts by employees
25
to gather evidence against their employers. Other cases involve
more typical violations of work rules that the employer did not dis26
cover until after suit was filed.
In many cases, after-acquired evidence has little significance.
Once an employer makes an adverse employment decision, the fact
that a disciplined employee also engaged in other misconduct is not
usually important. However, after-acquired evidence can become
significant if the disciplined employee challenges the employer’s
decision. If the after-acquired evidence constitutes misconduct for
which the employer would have also disciplined the employee, the
after-acquired evidence may affect liability and damages.

24. It would, of course, be possible for résumé or job application fraud to implicate pre-litigation efforts where individuals submitted materially false and misleading job applications. However, no known decision addresses such a situation,
and issues pertaining to labor law and labor management are beyond the scope of
this Article.
25. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 355
(1995) (finding plaintiff copied confidential financial documents in the year preceding her termination because she was afraid she was about to be fired because
of her age); O’Day I, 79 F.3d at 758 (finding plaintiff rifled through supervisor’s
desk after being denied promotion, and discovered and stole confidential documents pertaining to the promotion decision and other sensitive personnel matters); Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667, 674-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (refusing to limit plaintiff’s recovery through use of afteracquired evidence where, in post-termination case, plaintiff was afforded office
space to assist her re-employment efforts, and she discovered and copied her personnel file); Lewis, 495 S.E.2d at 441-42 (holding plaintiff surreptitiously taped
management personnel).
26. See, e.g., Preston v. Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Co., 647 A.2d 364, 366
(Conn. 1994) (finding that employer discovered that approximately ten months
before plaintiff was terminated, plaintiff placed poison ivy on toilet seat of
restroom used by managers “because of his frustration and anger with his employer”); Walters v. United States Gypsum Co., 537 N.W.2d 708, 709 (Iowa 1995)
(finding that employer discovered that plaintiff-employee who worked as heavy
machinery operator had come to work on prior occasions under the influence of
beer or marijuana); Schuessler v. Benchmark Mktg. and Consulting, Inc., 500
N.W.2d 529, 539-40 (Neb. 1993) (recognizing that an undiscovered incident of
sexual harassment could, in theory, bar suit as after-acquired evidence, but remanding for determination as to whether harassment occurred).
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B. After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination
Claims under Federal Law
Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in
27
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., federal courts
adopted two dominant views as to the use of after-acquired evidence in employment discrimination claims. Under one approach,
articulated by the Tenth Circuit in Summers v. State Farm Mutual
28
Automobile Insurance Co., after-acquired evidence barred all
29
An alternate holding, advanced by the
claims by employees.
30
Eleventh Circuit in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., stated that,
in the context of federal discrimination claims, after-acquired evi31
dence could limit damages but not bar suit.
In McKennon, the Court resolved this circuit split by upholding the Eleventh Circuit and holding that after-acquired evidence
32
did not constitute a complete bar to an age discrimination claim.
The Court concluded that such evidence could limit an employee’s
remedy to back-pay between the date of unlawful discharge and
33
the date when the after-acquired evidence was discovered. However, the Court characterized this model as the “beginning point,”
which could be modified by “taking into . . . account extraordinary
equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either
34
party.” The Court reasoned that both the public interest in eradicating discrimination and the remedial nature of statutes prohibiting such discrimination would be frustrated by adopting a rule precluding all relief. But the Court additionally noted that, “as a
general rule,” prospective relief such as reinstatement or front-pay
35
would be inappropriate.
The McKennon Court distinguished after-acquired evidence
from its line of mixed motive cases which, before enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, held that if an employer possessed two
motives, one legitimate and one not, the legitimate motive sufficed
36
to bar suit. The Court noted that mixed motive cases presented
27. 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
28. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
29. See id. at 708.
30. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), reh’g granted, opinion vacated, 32 F.3d 1489
(11th Cir. 1994), and decision en banc, 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995).
31. See id. at 1180-81.
32. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358.
33. See id. at 362.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 361-62.
36. See id. at 359-61 (discussing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (plurality

FISHER.FMT.DOC

278

11/01/00 12:38 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[17:2

situations where the employer possessed both motives at the time
the disciplinary decision was made and actually relied upon both
37
motives. In contrast, the “express assumption” before the holding
in McKennon was that the employer only had one unlawfully dis38
criminatory motive, which was “the sole basis for the firing.” The
Court perceived this distinction as being critical within the context
39
of unlawful discrimination.
The Court’s holding was underpinned by four important interrelated considerations. First, McKennon involved pre-termination
misconduct, not résumé or job application fraud. The case therefore presented circumstances where the employment relationship
was established undeniably before the alleged misconduct occurred. Second, McKennon presented a situation where the employer conceded that it had discriminated unlawfully against the
plaintiff. There was, accordingly, no question but that the employer had, in fact, violated the law in its initial disciplinary decision. Third, McKennon arose in the context of a remedial federal
statute enacted to combat impermissible discrimination, giving the
case important public policy implications. Fourth, although the
Court held that after-acquired evidence could not constitute an absolute bar to all relief, it did not hold that relief must be awarded.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Court emphasized that its model for
determining damages was a “beginning point” which could be
modified by “extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the
40
legitimate interests of either party.” Although McKennon has not
been adopted expressly by the Alaska Supreme Court in the context of state anti-discrimination laws, it may be assumed that the
Alaska court will adopt the same or a similar form of the McKen41
non rule when the issue is raised.

opinion), 260-61 (White, J., concurring), 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (1989).
See also Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071, 1075 (reversing that aspect of Price Waterhouse that barred relief in mixed
motive cases). A more comprehensive review of mixed motive cases and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 is beyond the scope of this article.
37. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 359.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 359-60.
40. Id. at 362.
41. The Alaska Supreme Court has consistently explained that, although state
law prohibiting employment discrimination affords individuals somewhat greater
protection than Title VII, state law should be interpreted and applied in a manner
generally consistent with federal law. See, e.g., French v. Jadon, Inc., 911 P.2d 20,
28 n.8 (Alaska 1996); Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc., 601 P.2d 584, 585
(Alaska 1979).

FISHER.FMT.DOC

2000]

11/01/00 12:38 PM

AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE

279

C. After-Acquired Evidence in Wrongful Termination Claims
The McKennon Court’s analysis was driven principally by the
Court’s concern that laws prohibiting impermissible discrimination
should be broadly interpreted to achieve their remedial goals and
further the public interest. The Court understandably was reluctant to permit employers who acted with an impermissibly discriminatory motive to shield themselves from liability by relying on
some lesser-form of wrongdoing committed by the employee.
However, in ordinary employment disputes, no such special concerns exist. Instead, employers’ decisions to discipline an employee
usually implicate nothing more than the contractual terms and
conditions of employment. No overriding public interest is involved, and no remedial statutes govern such routine employment
decisions. With this distinction in mind, the majority of courts hold
that after-acquired evidence bars suit in ordinary wrongful termi42
nation cases.
For example, in Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Sa43
maritan Society, Inc., the Kansas Court of Appeals held that afteracquired evidence constituted a complete bar to suit in wrongful
discharge cases not implicating public policy or discriminatory mo44
tive. The court reviewed existing contract and equity principles,
and reasoned that ordinary employment disputes did not implicate
any of the special concerns of anti-discrimination statutes that ani45
mated the McKennon Court. Although the Kansas court determined that McKennon should not govern ordinary contract cases, it
nevertheless found McKennon’s approach to after-acquired evidence instructive. The court construed McKennon as setting out a
three-part test for determining whether after-acquired evidence
should be admissible: (1) the employee must have committed misconduct of which the employer was unaware; (2) the misconduct
would have justified discharge; and (3) the employer would have
46
discharged the employee had it known of the misconduct. The
court concluded that this was an appropriate test that, if satisfied,
42. See, e.g., O’Day II, 959 P.2d 792, 795 (Ariz. 1998); Lewis v. Fisher Serv.
Co., 495 S.E.2d 440, 444-45 (S.C. 1998); Crawford Rehabilitation Servs., Inc. v.
Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 548-49 (Colo. 1997); Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler &
Marmaro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 337-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); see also Kerns, Inc. v.
Wella Corp., 114 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying New York law and holding that McKennon is inapplicable in governing after-acquired evidence in an ordinary contract dispute).
43. 921 P.2d 224 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
44. See id. at 232.
45. See id.
46. See id.
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should bar suit in ordinary employment contract disputes.47 On ap48
peal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court accepted the
court of appeals’ reasoning that ordinary contract claims were not
imbued with any special concerns and hence not governed by
McKennon. The “overwhelming majority” of courts have reached
49
similar results.
However, courts do not always apply the same standards and
50
analysis. By way of illustration, in Lewis v. Fisher Service Co., the
South Carolina Supreme Court agreed that after-acquired evidence
51
barred all relief in ordinary wrongful termination cases. Yet, the
court expressed concern that “less-than-principled” employers
might scour an employee’s file to find evidence of misconduct to
52
avoid liability. The court therefore established two prerequisites
53
to govern admissibility of after-acquired evidence. First, afteracquired evidence would be admissible only if it was “significant”
in the sense that it would have resulted in the employee’s termina54
tion. Second, the court specified that such evidence would have to
55
be established by clear and convincing evidence. Other than generally linking the “significance” of a decision to its end result, the
court offered no guidance for determining when after-acquired
evidence should be considered “significant,” and left unanswered
whether an objective or subjective standard or both should govern
in examining the employer’s motives.
56
In Crawford Rehabilitation Services, Inc. v. Weissman, the
Colorado Supreme Court determined that after-acquired evidence
should be governed by a “reasonable, objective employer” standard, and would bar an employee’s claims only if the evidence was
material and, in the specific context of résumé fraud, “undermined
57
the very basis upon which [the employee] was hired.” Conversely,
in Gassman, the Kansas Court of Appeals by implication adopted a
subjective standard based on the employer’s proffer that it would
58
have terminated Gassman had it known of her misconduct. The

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id.
See Gassman II, 933 P.2d 743, 745 (Kan. 1997).
O’Day II, 959 P.2d at 795 (discussing principles and citing authority).
495 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. 1998).
See id. at 444-45.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
938 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1997).
Id. at 549.
See Gassman I, 921 P.2d 224, 233 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
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Kansas Supreme Court by implication affirmed the same standard.59 In Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler, & Marmaro,60 the California Court of Appeal analyzed the use of after-acquired evidence
61
as an outgrowth of the doctrine of unclean hands. This analysis
led the court to adopt a subjective standard emphasizing “the [specific] subject matter [of the after-acquired evidence] involved
62
and . . . the equitable relations between the litigants.” Neither
Gassman, Weissman, nor Camp discusses the quantum of proof
necessary to prove after-acquired evidence.
However, notwithstanding the developing weight of authority,
some courts have implied that no uniform rule can be declared,
thereby leaving the possibility open that different rules would develop depending upon the specific nature of claims and the afteracquired evidence involved. For example, in O’Day v. McDonnell
63
Douglas Helicopter Co., the Arizona Supreme Court held that after-acquired evidence bars an employee’s common law breach of
contract claim, but only limits the available remedies for the em64
ployee’s separate, tortious, wrongful termination claim. In Camp,
the court held that résumé fraud barred a claim alleging that the
termination violated public policy because the particular fraudulent
misrepresentation, failing to disclose prior felony convictions on
their job applications, concerned eligibility requirements imposed
65
by the federal government. By failing to disclose these convictions, plaintiffs not only lied to the employer but also placed their
employer at risk of falsely certifying to the federal government that
66
no employees in the affected positions had felony convictions. It
was this added consequence of the misrepresentations that per67
suaded the court to rule in favor of the employer. However, the
court appeared to suggest that a different result might be reached if
the fraudulent misrepresentation only implicated an employer’s in68
ternal guidelines or self-imposed requirements. In Horn v. De69
partment of Corrections, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
the after-acquired evidence would not bar all claims, but would

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Gassman II, 933 P.2d 743, 747-48 (Kan. 1997).
41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
See id. at 338-40.
Id. at 340.
959 P.2d 792 (Ariz. 1998).
See id. at 795-97.
See Camp, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337-39.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 337.
548 N.W.2d 660 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
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simply limit available remedies in a lawsuit alleging sexual harassment, constructive discharge, and retaliation.70 The court reached
this holding even though only some of the plaintiff’s claims impli71
cated discriminatory motive.
D. General Principles of Alaska Employment Law
Before reviewing how Alaska courts treat after-acquired evidence, it is necessary to review some relevant principles defining
employment relationships in Alaska. The following section summarizes the most commonly encountered principles defining the
terms and conditions of employment relationships under Alaska
law. Special considerations related to public employment or collective bargaining relationships are beyond the scope of this article.
1. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. In
Alaska, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in
72
The covenant provides that
every employment relationship.
neither party will act in bad faith to deprive the other of the
benefits of the employment relationship. It includes both an
73
objective and a subjective prong. The subjective prong prohibits
an employer from taking adverse action to deprive an employee of
74
a contract benefit. The objective prong obligates employers to act
75
in a manner that a reasonable person would regard as fair. This
covenant of good faith and fair dealing obligates employers to treat
76
similarly situated employees in a like manner. The covenant gives
effect to the parties’ reasonable expectations but does not alter
77
those expectations. It does not prohibit what would otherwise be
78
permitted expressly by an existing employment contract.
2. Contract Formation and Interpretation.
Terms and
conditions of employment may be defined by an express
employment contract or by implication through policies or
70. See id. at 664-65.
71. See id.
72. See Mitford v. Ferdinand de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983); see
also Chijide v. Maniilaq Ass’n of Kotzebue, 972 P.2d 167, 172 (Alaska 1999).
73. See Chijide, 972 P.2d at 172.
74. See id.
75. See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Alaska
1992).
76. See id.; see also Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 789
n.6 (Alaska 1989); Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050, 1056
(Alaska 1986).
77. See Mitford, 666 P.2d at 1007.
78. See Ramsey v. City of Sand Point, 936 P.2d 126, 133 (Alaska 1997).
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employment manuals disseminated by the employer.79 In Alaska,
80
contract interpretation presents a question of law for the court.
The court’s duty is to give effect to the parties’ reasonable
81
In order to ascertain the parties’ reasonable
expectations.
expectations, the court examines the language of the disputed
provision, other terms and provisions in the contract, relevant
82
extrinsic evidence, and case law interpreting similar provisions.
Under Alaska contract law, the court may examine relevant
83
extrinsic evidence even if the contract is unambiguous, including
84
evidence that bears on the parties’ intention and the parties’
85
subsequent conduct. If a contract is unambiguous, its meaning
86
presents a question of law for the court to resolve. However, if
the parties present extrinsic evidence to clarify an ambiguous
contract, the contract’s meaning should be determined by the trier
87
of fact. A contract is ambiguous when it supports two different,
88
but reasonable interpretations.
3. Employers’ Decisions to Impose Discipline. Determining
the substantive limits of an employer’s right to impose discipline is
ordinarily but not exclusively a question of identifying and
interpreting an applicable contract. If the terms and conditions of
employment are defined by express or implied contract, the
employer may not impose discipline in a manner contrary to that
89
contract. If no contract exists, the employer’s ability to discipline
employees is still constrained by the implied covenant of good faith
79. See id. (holding that the contract expressly provided for termination); see
also Jones, 779 P.2d at 787 (recognizing that employment contracts may be formed
by operation of employer’s personnel manual).
80. See Zuelsdorf v. University of Alaska, Fairbanks, 794 P.2d 932, 933
(Alaska 1990).
81. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Gentile, 922 P.2d 248, 255 (Alaska
1996).
82. See Peterson v. Wirum, 625 P.2d 866, 872 n.10 (Alaska 1981).
83. See Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Tundra Tours, Inc., 719 P.2d 1020,
1024 n.6 (Alaska 1986) (citing Peterson v. Wirum, 625 P.2d 866, 871-72 n.9
(Alaska 1981)).
84. See Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490, 497 n.22 (Alaska 1979).
85. See Tundra Tours, 719 P.2d at 1024.
86. See Johnson v. Schaub, 867 P.2d 812, 818 n.12 (Alaska 1994).
87. See Little Susitna Constr. Co. v. Soil Processing, Inc., 944 P.2d 20, 23
(Alaska 1997).
88. See McMillan v. Anchorage Community Hosp., 646 P.2d 857, 863 (Alaska
1982).
89. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050, 1056
(Alaska 1986).
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and fair dealing, which governs all employment relationships even
if there is no contract.90 In traditional terminology, employment
relationships generally are defined as being “at will” or “for
91
cause.” An “at will employee” may be terminated for any reason
that does not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair
92
dealing. A “for cause employee” may be disciplined only if the
employer has a reasonable basis that is not arbitrary, capricious, or
unlawful, that is supported by substantial evidence, and that is
93
Substantial
reasonably believed by the employer to be true.
evidence is defined by the court as “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
94
An employer’s good faith belief is all that is
conclusion.”
95
necessary to justify an employment decision. The employer need
96
not establish that the alleged misconduct actually occurred, as it is
sufficient if the employer reasonably believes in good faith that the
97
employee committed the alleged misconduct. Yet, bad faith is not
established simply because the employer chooses to disbelieve the
98
employee’s version of events. The Alaska Supreme Court has
emphasized that employers’ management discretion should be
99
respected.

90. See Alaska Marine Pilots v. Hendsch, 950 P.2d 98, 109 (Alaska 1997).
91. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130-31
(Alaska 1989).
92. See ERA Aviation, Inc. v. Seekins, 973 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Alaska 1999).
93. See Braun v. Alaska Commercial Fishing and Agric. Bank, 816 P.2d 140,
142 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc.,
769 P.2d 298, 304 (Wash. 1989)).
94. Smith v. Sampson, 816 P.2d 902, 904 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Storrs v. State
Med. Bd., 664 P.2d 547, 554 (Alaska 1983)).
95. See Van Huff v. Sohio Alaska Petroleum Co., 835 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Alaska
1992).
96. See Holland v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 993 P.2d 1026, 1035-36 (Alaska
1999).
97. See Braun, 816 P.2d at 142; see generally Simpson v. Western Graphics
Corp., 643 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Or. 1982).
98. See Holland, 993 P.2d at 1035-36.
99. See, e.g., id. at 1034-36; Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage, 899 P.2d 149,
153 (Alaska 1995).
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E. Alaska Law Regarding After-Acquired Evidence
The Alaska Supreme Court has not decided what effect, if any,
after-acquired evidence would have in employment litigation.
However, in Brogdon v. City of Klawock,100 the court offered some
preliminary views that may have predictive value and may affect
trial courts’ resolution of these issues. In Brogdon, the City of
Klawock terminated Brogdon from his position with its Depart101
ment of Public Safety. Brogdon filed suit alleging wrongful ter102
Thereafter, Klawock discovered evidence of other
mination.
misconduct and moved for summary judgment on the basis of this
103
The trial court denied Klawock’s moafter-acquired evidence.
tion, but opined that “such evidence may be admissible to limit
104
damages.” After a motion to limit damages, the trial court ruled
that after-acquired evidence would be admissible only “if it is evidence that [the City] would reasonably have discovered if Brogdon
105
had not been terminated.”
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the trial
106
court’s limitation on introduction of after-acquired evidence. The
court held that the trial court erred in concluding that afteracquired evidence could be relied upon only if it was evidence that
107
would have been discovered had the termination not occurred.
However, the court went further to offer some insights into the use
of after-acquired evidence in employment discipline cases. The
court expressed its concern that employers might base “new rea108
sons for termination” on pretext. The court stated its view that
109
“[a]fter-the-fact justifications should be viewed with skepticism.”
As a safeguard for potential abuses, the court suggested that it
“might be appropriate to fashion a rule that no post-termination
justification should serve to limit damages unless it is one which all
reasonable employers would regard as mandating termination and
110
which is, as a matter of law, just cause for termination.” Additionally, the court suggested that it might be appropriate to impose
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

930 P.2d 989 (Alaska 1997).
See id.
See id. at 990.
See id. at 991.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 992.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a heightened burden of proof upon employers seeking to rely on
after-acquired evidence.111 The court also recognized that afteracquired evidence may bar all damages instead of merely limiting
112
Having flagged these issues for future conavailable remedies.
113
Although
sideration, the court reserved ruling on these issues.
undeniably dicta, it may be assumed that trial courts in Alaska will
accord the Brogdon court’s comments some deference.
III. PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING ANALYSES
Courts examining prospective evidence in litigation have failed
to define adequately when and whether evidence of undiscovered
pre-discipline misconduct should be considered after-acquired evidence. In addition, they have been unable to offer clarifying guidance under which standard such evidence should be evaluated.
This section briefly discusses these problems.
Courts have done little to define after-acquired evidence adequately. Some courts insist that after-acquired evidence be “significant” or “material” and that the alleged misconduct be such
that it would have led to the imposition of significant discipline,
114
However, no attempt has been made to
such as termination.
elaborate when misconduct is “significant” or “material.” Instead,
courts often appear willing to let employers, while in the midst of
litigation, explain by way of affidavit or testimony that the recently
discovered misconduct was significant and that they would have
disciplined the employee had they uncovered the misconduct ear115
lier. The general tendency of courts to refrain from defining after-acquired evidence may arise from courts’ reluctance to secondguess management decisions or to intrude needlessly upon the
116
business judgment of corporate officers. However, if employers
are accorded unbridled discretion to determine the level of misconduct that is significant enough to constitute a serious offense,
employers may invoke after-acquired evidence to impose discipline
for minor violations of work rules or company policies for which
discipline is not ordinarily imposed. As the Brogdon court suggested, there is a tension between recognizing an employer’s right
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fisher Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d 440, 445 (S.C. 1998); Crawford Rehabilitation Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 549 (Colo. 1997).
115. See, e.g., Trico Technologies Corp. v. Montiel, 949 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex.
1997); O’Day I, 79 F.3d 756, 761-72 (9th Cir. 1996).
116. See, e.g., Holland v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 993 P.2d 1026, 1035-36 (Alaska
1999); Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage, 899 P.2d 149, 153 (Alaska 1995).
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to discipline employees and guarding against pretextual discipline.
Employees are concerned that unscrupulous employers facing suit
may fabricate after-acquired evidence in an attempt to preclude
suit or limit damages, but employers are troubled by the implication that employees may escape all punishment because they were
clever or duplicitous enough to conceal their wrongdoing. Employers cannot know what all employees are doing at all times and
often do not learn about after-acquired evidence until they are
forced by a lawsuit to investigate a particular employee’s work history. These competing and legitimate concerns are not being addressed by existing analyses.
Furthermore, by insisting that after-acquired evidence be “significant” or “material,” courts appear to have signaled a preliminary view that after-acquired evidence should be considered only if
117
it would have resulted in the employee’s termination. But given
that other forms of discipline may well affect damages such as reinstatement or front-pay, there does not seem to be any discernible
reason in law, policy, or logic to restrict after-acquired evidence to
evidence of misconduct that inevitably leads to termination.
An analogous question concerns post-termination misconduct
as opposed to post-discipline misconduct. Where an employee is
terminated and then commits misconduct that would have led to
discipline had she still been employed, the developing trend seems
to suggest that such post-termination misconduct is not admissi118
ble. However, here again, it is not clear why an employee’s post119
termination misconduct would not be relevant to damages.
As Brogdon implies, courts have offered no clearly articulated
guidance concerning how an employer may establish that alleged
misconduct is significant or how an employee may rebut the em120
Moreover, courts appear to
ployer’s after-acquired evidence.
have concluded mechanically that the McKennon test for damages
should apply to all cases without thought or analysis. Under

117. See, e.g., O’Day I, 79 F.3d at 759 (stating the basic McKennon rule that the
“employer must establish not only that it could have fired an employee for the
later-discovered misconduct, but that it would in fact have done so”).
118. See, e.g., Carr v. Woodbury County Juvenile Detention Ctr., 905 F. Supp.
619, 628-29 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F.
Supp. 667, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 879 F.
Supp. 534, 537-38 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
119. See Christine Neylon O’Brien, The Law of After-Acquired Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Cases: Clarification of the Employer’s Burden, Remedial Guidance, and the Enigma of Post-Termination Misconduct, 65 U. MO. KAN.
C. L. REV. 159, 167-74 (1996).
120. See Brogdon v. City of Klawock, 930 P.2d 989, 991-92 (Alaska 1997).
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McKennon, back-pay is permissible and is calculated between the
date of wrongful discharge and the date when the employer discovers the after-acquired evidence. Yet, although this is only a “beginning point” subject to modification if “extraordinary equitable
circumstances [exist] that affect the legitimate interests of either
121
party,” courts have stopped at the “beginning point” without further inquiry. Arguably, awarding back-pay from the date of an initial unlawfully imposed discipline and the date when other misconduct is discovered rewards the stealthy wrongdoer who is capable
of concealing her misconduct.
These are merely a few of the more significant evidentiary and
procedural issues implicated by after-acquired evidence. They
await further clarification from courts in general, including the
Alaska Supreme Court.
IV. RECOMMENDED APPROACH
A. Defining After-Acquired Evidence
The significance or materiality of alleged misconduct should
be evaluated by reference to both the employer’s and the employee’s reasonable expectations regarding whether the alleged
misconduct constituted grounds for discipline. If the misconduct is
not of the type for which all reasonable employers or employees
would normally expect disciplinary action, any discipline should be
grounded in a specific contractual relationship with the employee.
Further, one should consider an employee’s expectations based on
the contractual nature of the employment relationship. However,
when determining whether the employee committed the misconduct, Alaska courts should apply the general rules and principles
governing employment discipline.
It is possible to evaluate misconduct under multiple standards.
Under an objective standard, in extreme instances of gross misconduct, reasonable employers would be warranted in disciplining an
employee after the discovery of the after-acquired evidence. For
example, no reasonable employer would be expected to tolerate
employees who steal valuable company property or who operate
heavy machinery under the influence of controlled substances.
However, if the misconduct is not of this type, the employer should
have discretion to impose discipline only through a specific contractual relationship with the employee. This approach can be considered a subjective standard and is consistent with Alaska law.
Under Alaska law, the parties’ reasonable expectations are evalu121. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995).
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ated in light of contractual terms, relevant extrinsic evidence, and
case law.122 In keeping with these principles, employers should be
able to establish that discipline would have been imposed by
analogizing to similar cases, relying on company policy, and submitting affidavits and additional evidence.
Equally important are an employee’s expectations based on
the contractual nature of the employment relationship. Employers
should not be able to rely upon the after-acquired evidence if it
cannot be established that the employee knew or reasonably
should have known that the discipline would be imposed for the
misconduct in question. The Alaska courts should therefore require employers to establish either that the employee had actual
knowledge of the rule or policy in question or that the misconduct
was of the type and nature that a reasonable employee in the employee’s position would have realized could warrant disciplinary
action. In reaching this assessment, employees should not be able
to profess ignorance about established work rules, thereby shielding themselves from the consequences of misconduct. However,
employers should not be permitted to invoke obscure little-known
rules that rarely, if ever, serve as the basis of discipline.
Alaska courts should apply the general rules and principles
governing employment discipline when determining whether the
employee committed the misconduct. An employer’s reasonable
good faith belief, based on facts supported by substantial evidence,
123
is all that is necessary to justify an employment decision. Other
employees’ statements may be relied upon to establish a good faith
belief.
It still remains to be seen if the Alaska courts will distinguish
between misconduct consisting of pre-litigation activity and misconduct violating ordinary work rules and policies. Adopting an
approach based in existing contract and equity principles as suggested here, however, would make such a distinction unnecessary.
This recommendation is consistent with the Alaska Supreme
Court’s test for evaluating alleged breaches of the implied covenant
124
of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships. Requiring a more specific explanation of the grounds for an employer’s decision provides necessary safeguards and obviates the

122. See Peterson v. Wirum, 625 P.2d 866, 827 n.10 (Alaska 1981).
123. See, e.g., Holland v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 993 P.2d 1026, 1035-36 (Alaska
1999); Braun v. Alaska Commercial Fishing and Agric. Bank, 816 P.2d 140, 142
(Alaska 1991).
124. See Chijide v. Manilaq Ass’n of Kotzebue, 972 P.2d 167, 172 (Alaska
1999).
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need for problematic solutions such as imposing a heightened burden of proof.
B. After-Acquired Evidence Should Bar Suit
After-acquired evidence should bar suit in all wrongful termination cases except those alleging employment discrimination or
civil rights claims. At their core, employment relationships are
contractual in nature and if an employee has breached her employment contract, she does not have a cause of action against her
employer for wrongful termination. Additionally, an employee
who has violated the equitable nature of an employment relationship should not be permitted to seek relief in derogation of the
doctrine of unclean hands. Finally, the integrity of justice supports
barring claims where after-acquired evidence exists. An employee
who has committed and concealed misconduct for which she would
have been disciplined should not be permitted to complain if the
truth of that misconduct is discovered.
In some cases, after-acquired evidence may relate to misconduct which leads to an outcome less severe than termination, such
as job re-classification, layoff, salary reduction, demotion, or transfer. In these situations, after-acquired evidence should bar prospective relief and limit the employee’s remedy to damages between the date of wrongful discipline (if it is established that it was
wrongful) and the date when the employee actually committed the
misconduct related to the after-acquired evidence. This test differs
from the test employed by some courts. Where courts hold that after-acquired evidence limits damages but does not bar suit, the
limitation usually is described as running from the date of discipline to the date when the employer discovers the after-acquired
125
evidence.
Courts applying McKennon’s discovery date test without reflection ignore three principal flaws. First, it rewards a deceptive
employee twice for violating work rules. An employee who has
engaged in misconduct should not benefit from being able to conceal her misconduct. Such concealment is a breach of the duty of
loyalty owed to the employer and therefore constitutes additional
126
misconduct for which discipline could be imposed. Second, it encourages litigation by rewarding the errant employee who files suit
125. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362
(1995); O’Day I, 79 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 1996).
126. The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized an agent’s or employee’s duty
of loyalty. See Calvo v. Calhoon, 559 P.2d 111, 116-17 (Alaska 1977). However,
the duty has not been the source of much litigation, and consequently its contours
have not been well-established in Alaska.
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before the employer learns of the employee’s misconduct. Third,
in cases of résumé fraud, the discovery date model validates
fraudulent conduct used to create an employment relationship,
which thereby permits “an employee who intentionally misrepresents his or her qualifications, or lies on an application . . . to recover back pay . . . that would not have occurred without fraudu127
lent actions.” A better approach would limit available remedies
to the time between the date of wrongful discipline and the date of
the misconduct constituting the after-acquired evidence. If the
misconduct forming the basis of after-acquired evidence precedes
the allegedly wrongful discipline, the employee should not be entitled to any damages.
In cases alleging employment discrimination, Alaska should
adopt the McKennon standard with the modifications previously
discussed. Instead of applying a standard that runs from the date
of discipline to the date when the employer discovers the afteracquired evidence, the standard should run from the date of discipline to the date of the misconduct related to the after-acquired
evidence. Since damages are not an element of a plaintiff’s case
under state or federal discrimination law, the suit would not be
barred even if the date when the misconduct related to the afteracquired evidence occurred before the date of discipline. Thus, the
employee would still be entitled to nominal damages and attorney’s
fees under Alaska law, the former vindicating the public interest
and the latter ensuring that employers who impermissibly discriminated against employees would not gain an undeserved windfall.
The court could further advance the public interest by ordering
certain forms of injunctive and declaratory relief, such as requiring
an employer to post notices acknowledging its culpability and assuring employees that it will comply with the law in the future.
Measures of this nature are commonly employed by the National
Labor Relations Board in related contexts, and there seems to be
little reason in law or policy why courts could not impose similar
penalties as a means of vindicating the public interest in eradicating
unlawful employment discrimination.
C. Evidentiary and Procedural Issues
1. Burden of Proof. Alaska should require employers to
establish after-acquired evidence by a preponderance of evidence.
127. William D. Fisher, Employment Law: McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co. and After-Acquired Evidence—A Convincing Resolution to Employer/Employee Misconduct or an Incomplete Assessment of the Issue?, 50 OKLA.
L. REV. 135, 148 (1997).
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The Ninth Circuit has adopted this standard to assess afteracquired evidence in the context of federal discrimination claims.128
The Brogdon court tentatively suggested without holding that it
might be appropriate to require employers to establish the
existence of after-acquired evidence by a heightened burden of
129
proof. The burden of proof should not be raised to a clear and
convincing standard for four reasons.
First, under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis
used to resolve employment discrimination claims alleging disparate treatment, where there is no direct evidence of the employer’s
130
allegedly unlawful intent, a defendant may rebut a plaintiff’s
prima facie claim by “articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscrimina131
tory reason” for the challenged decision. This showing has been
132
described as a “relatively light burden,” and does not require the
defendant-employer to support its avowed basis by a preponder133
ance of the evidence. The burden of proof remains at all times
134
with the plaintiff. If employers may shift the burden of production in civil rights and employment discrimination claims with
minimal evidence, where courts are particularly solicitous of plaintiff’s rights, it makes little sense to impose a greater burden of
proof in assessing after-acquired evidence.
Second, an elevated burden of proof conflicts with basic principles of Alaska law that govern an employer’s right to discipline
employees. An employer’s good faith belief is all that is necessary
135
The employer need not esto justify an employment decision.
136
tablish that the alleged misconduct actually occurred; it is sufficient if the employer merely believes in good faith that the em-

128. See O’Day I, 79 F.3d at 761.
129. See Bragdon v. City of Klawock, 930 P.2d 989, 992 (Alaska 1997).
130. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
131. Id.
132. Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privitazation of Title VII and the Contours
of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 178 (1993).
133. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56,
259-60 (1981). At least one Alaska Superior Court, however, required the employer to establish its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason by a preponderance of
the evidence. See VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 919 n.29 (Alaska 1999)
(quoting jury instruction given by trial court).
134. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
135. See, e.g., Braun v. Alaska Commerical Fishing and Agric. Bank, 816 P.2d
140, 142 (Alaska 1991).
136. See, e.g., id.; Holland v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 993 P.2d 1026, 1035-36
(Alaska 1999).

FISHER.FMT.DOC

2000]

11/01/00 12:38 PM

AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE

293

ployee committed the alleged misconduct.137 In addition, bad faith
is not established simply because the employer chooses to disbe138
lieve the employee’s version of events. To require employers to
establish grounds through clear and convincing evidence would
conflict with all of these basic principles. Moreover, it would invite
error from juries struggling to reconcile two otherwise similar verdicts—one forming the basis for the initial and allegedly wrongful
decision, and the second forming the basis for imposing discipline
based on after-acquired evidence.
Third, imposing a heightened burden of proof ignores practical
realities of the workplace. Aside from safety or security-related
jobs, few employers closely scrutinize employee conduct because of
considerations related to cost, morale, and productivity. If courts
insist that employers establish proof of employee misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence, employers will inevitably increase
monitoring efforts. This will not only increase work-related costs,
but will also implicate privacy-related concerns. On a related
point, after-acquired evidence is often based on misrepresentations
made in résumés or job applications. If courts insist on clear and
convincing evidence of misconduct, screening and processing of job
applications may also become more time-consuming and costly.
One commentator persuasively notes that applying McKennon literally may result in unintended consequences of delaying job application processing and screening out otherwise qualified persons
139
who would be protected by Title VII.
Fourth, a clear and convincing standard would create inconsistencies in the law and would raise artificial distinctions that have no
support in policy. After-acquired evidence often reflects an employee’s fraudulent acts or omissions; for example, an employee
may engage in résumé fraud or misappropriation of company
property. In Alaska, fraud is established by a preponderance of the
140
evidence; thus, it would contradict law and policy to hold an employer to an elevated standard in this context. Under the pleading
standard for fraud recommended by this Article, if courts require
that employers establish particularized grounds for application of
after-acquired evidence, it will be unnecessary to impose a heightened burden of proof on employers.
Some commentators, apparently under the assumption that
any decision by an employer is inherently pretextual, have sug137. See, e.g., Holland, 993 P.2d at 1035-36.
138. See id.
139. See Jenny B. Wahl, Protecting the Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Perverse Consequences of the McKennon Rule, 32 AKRON L. REV. 577, 597-602 (1999).
140. See Gabaig v. Gabaig, 717 P.2d 835, 838-39 (Alaska 1986).
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gested an analysis that effectively would impose a clear and convincing standard of proof on employers.141 The problem with this
view is that it ignores employers’ management discretion and creates impermissible presumptions in the absence of any proof of
wrongdoing. No study, empirical or otherwise, has established that
employers use after-acquired evidence in an impermissible manner.
The only viable objection to employing a preponderance of
the evidence standard as opposed to a clear and convincing standard is that an employer who is relying upon after-acquired evidence is unaware of any legitimate reason to impose discipline.
Unlike “mixed motive” cases, where an employer possesses both a
valid and invalid reason for imposing discipline, an employer who
has to rely on after-acquired evidence has, allegedly, made an im142
permissible or unlawful decision to impose discipline. This argument has persuasive force in the specific context of McKennon’s
holding: an employer who conceded that its initial disciplinary decision was impermissible. However, closer scrutiny of the argument reveals that it rests on a premise that is untenable in many
fact situations. Typically, employers relying on after-acquired evidence are unaware of any legitimate reason to impose discipline
because the employee had successfully concealed her misconduct
from the employer. Penalizing the employer for the employee’s
duplicity seems unsupportable in law, policy, or logic. Moreover,
unlike McKennon, where the employer conceded that its initial decision was illegally motivated, most employers do not concede that
their initial decision was unlawful. It is inappropriate to assume
that an employer’s initial disciplinary decision was unlawful when
143
Alaska courts should
the employee bears the burden of proof.
reject a clear and convincing evidence standard and instead impose
a preponderance of the evidence standard in employment cases.
2. Questions Related to the Admissibility of After-Acquired
Evidence.
Few courts have ruled after-acquired evidence
inadmissible as a blanket rule. However, other issues related to
admissibility have been raised and merit brief comment. One issue
that is slowly surfacing is whether post-termination or postemployment evidence of misconduct should be admissible.
141. See, e.g., Samuel A. Mills, Toward an Equitable After-Acquired Evidence
Rule, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1555-56 (1994); Zemelman, supra note 132, at 20910 (arguing that a clear and convincing standard should apply “because . . . the
employer’s defense is inherently hypothetical”).
142. See O’Day I, 79 F.3d 756, 765-68 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fletcher, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
143. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993).
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The few courts examining post-termination evidence of misconduct have held, under the particular circumstances presented,
that such evidence should be excluded. For example, in Carr v.
144
Woodbury County Juvenile Detention Center, Carr filed suit
claiming that she was constructively discharged from her position
from a county juvenile detention center due to a racially and sexu145
ally hostile work environment. Yet, during routine discovery, the
defendants learned that Carr had used marijuana three or four
146
times a month after she resigned. The youth center had a policy
mandating discharge for any employee who used a controlled sub147
stance without seeking treatment. It was therefore clear that if
Carr had not quit her job, and if her drug use had been discovered,
148
she would have been disciplined, if not terminated. Nevertheless,
the court ruled the evidence of the post-employment misconduct
149
inadmissible. The court first determined that an employer’s poli150
cies and work rules could never be applied to a former employee.
Perhaps recognizing the tenuous nature of this rule, the court offered an additional rationale: the defendant could not establish that
it would have terminated Carr, because termination was only man151
dated if the employee failed to seek treatment. It was unknown,
and could not be established, whether Carr would have sought
152
treatment once evidence of her marijuana use was discovered.
Accordingly, any conclusions regarding what the employer would
have done were speculative.
On its specific facts, the holding in Carr appears correct because it was never established that the employer would have imposed discipline for the post-employment misconduct. However,
beyond this narrow holding, Carr seems unpersuasive. It is difficult
to see how post-discipline misconduct is not relevant and should
not be admissible because such misconduct directly relates to an
employee’s potential remedies. Employers usually may impose
discipline for off-duty misconduct if the misconduct relates to the
terms and conditions of employment. Carr’s situation is illustrative. A youth center should not be expected to reinstate a former
counselor who undeniably has used an unlawful, controlled sub144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

905 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
See id. at 621.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 631.
See id. at 629.
See id.
See id.
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stance. For similar reasons, a youth center should not be liable for
front-pay for discharging an employee under such circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
As trial courts continue to struggle more and more frequently
with concepts governing employment relationships, after-acquired
evidence will play an increasingly greater role in resolving disputes.
Trial courts, and ultimately the Alaska Supreme Court, will have to
decide when and whether after-acquired evidence should be permitted and what effect, if any, its use will have in employment litigation. The model suggested here is not without its own flaws, and
it does not address all of the implications of after-acquired evidence. However, the model parallels existing Alaska law and thus
offers uniform guidance with which the bench and bar are already
familiar.

